Abstract: This paper shows how my broadly Fregean formal semantic theory, upon amendment, is able to solve three problem cases that are variations of the sentence "The F is an F ". The amendment is the novel notion of so-called hyperoffices . These are fine-grained modes of presentation or persons-in-intension and serve to logically model 'impossible individuals', which are, naively speaking, people who could not possibly exist. Hyperoffices are required for the third of the problem cases, whereas standard individuals-in-intension (so-called offices) suffice for the first two cases. My theory is Tichý's Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL). I apply my amended version of TIL against the two neo-Meinongian theories of Zalta's object theory (OT) and Priest's modal Meinongianism (MM), which are contingently or necessarily non-existent individuals. Furthermore, the sentence "The F is an F " arguably lends itself to two importantly different readings. On one reading, property F is predicated of the object, if any, that is the unique instance of F . On the other reading, a necessary relation obtains between F and the condition for being the unique F . OT and TIL have each their own way of capturing these two readings, whereas MM denies that "The F is an F "states a necessary truth. The main result of this paper is that there is a broadly Fregean theory that fares well on typically Meinongian territory, namely cases where the unique F is non-existent .
News
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Graham Priest
LoC online seminar session on Wednesday, May 12 : Graham Priest on Mission Impossible.
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LoC (virtual) Conference 2021
LoC (virtual) Conference: 7-9 June 2021
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Thomas Ferguson
LoC online seminar session on Wednesday, February 3: Thomas Ferguson on Rethinking Griss’ Negationless Intuitionistic Mathematics
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Federico Faroldi
LoC online seminar session on Wednesday, November 18: Federico Faroldi (Ghent University) on The Structure of Reasons: Subtraction and Partiality
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Hans Rott
LoC online seminar session on Wednesday, October 21: Hans Rott (University of Regensburg)
on Difference-making conditionals and the Relevant Ramsey Test
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Daniel Hoek
LoC online seminar session on Wednesday, October 7: Daniel Hoek (Virginia Tech) on Questions in Action
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Jonathan Phillips
LoC online seminar session on Wednesday, September 9: Jonathan Phillips (Dartmouth) on How we know what not to think
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Jonathan Phillips
[CANCELLED] Jonathan Phillips (Dartmouth) on Now we know what not to think
LoC-DIP seminar session: Wednesday, March 11, 16:00- 17.30, at F1.15 @ ILLC
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Heinrich Wansing and Christopher Badura
Heinrich Wansing (Bochum) on Substructural negations as normal modal operators and
and Christopher Badura (Bochum) on Conditional Belief and Imaginative Episodes
LoC seminar: Wednesday, February 12, 10:00-15:00, at OTM 141, Faculteitskamer.
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Talk by Fabrizio Cariani
Fabrizio Cariani (Northwestern) on Indirect Evidence and the Easy Foreknowledge Puzzle. LoC seminar: Tuesday, December 17, 2019, 16:00-18:00, at the ILLC.
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Talk by Barbara Vetter (Berlin)
Barbara Vetter on agency-based approach to modal knowledge. Joint LoC/LIRa session: Thu, November 14, 2019, 16.30-18.00 at the ILLC.
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Talk by Dominic Gregory (Sheffield)
Dominic Gregory on counterfactuals and beliefs about possibility. LoC seminar: Wed, October 16, 2019, 10:00-12:00 in Oude Turfmarkt 141.
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Talk by Igor Douven (CNRS, Paris)
Igor Douven on abductive conditionals and Inferentialism: LoC seminar: Wed, April 24, 2019, 16.30-18.00 at the ILLC.
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Talk by Margot Strohminger (Oxford)
Margot Strohminger on belief in conditionals: LoC seminar: Wed, March 20, 2019, 10 am-12am in Oude Turfmarkt 141-143.
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Talk by Bjørn Jespersen (Utrecht)
Bjørn Jespersen on Fregean semantics: LoC seminar: Wed, Oct 31, 2018, 2 pm-4pm at the ILLC -
Talk by Catarina Dutilh Novaes
Catarina Dutilh Novaes on deduction and cognition: LoC seminar: Wed, Oct 3, 2018, 2pm-4pm at the ILLC
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Franz to St Andrews!
LoC's PI Franz moves to St Andrews, but the LoC work continues as before.