

# Game semantics for multi-player logics of imperfect information

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LINT          ILLC  
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To describe and study games (Game Logic, Coalition Logic, ...);

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# Game semantics for FOL

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Two Players, **I** and **II** (or Abelard and Eloise);

Positions of  $\|\phi\|_G$  are tuples  $(\psi, s, t)$ , where  $\psi \in \text{Sub}(\phi)$ ,  $s$  set of *annotations*,  $t \in \{\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{II}\}$ ;

Starting position =  $(\phi, \emptyset, \mathbf{II})$ ;

At position  $(\psi, s, t)$ , Player  $t$  chooses the next position;

# Game semantics for FOL

**Position**

$(\neg\psi, s, t)$

**Successors**

$(\psi, s, t')$

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$(\psi \vee \theta, s, t)$

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$(\psi, s, t), (\theta, s, t)$

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$(\psi, s + \{x:e\}, t)$

$e \in E$  (domain of quantification)

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$(\psi \vee \theta, s, t)$

$(\exists x \psi, s, t)$

$(R_{x_1, \dots, x_n}, s, t)$

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$e \in E$  (domain of quantification)

none

# Game semantics for FOL

Given a game structure  $\|\phi\|_G$  and a model  $M$ , we can *instantiate*  $\|\phi\|_G$  with  $M$ .

The *domain of quantification* becomes  $\text{Dom}(M)$ ;

A position  $(\phi, s, t)$ ,  $\phi$  atomic, is *winning* for  $t$  iff

$$M, s \models \phi$$

# Game semantics for FOL

(Van Benthem, 2003): **Logic games are complete for game logic**

*If a power statement (of game logic) is falsifiable by abstract sequential games then it is falsifiable by first-order evaluation games.*

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If now we consider winning strategies in these games, we move from Game Semantics to Game Theoretic Semantics.



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$$V(\|\phi\|_G(M)) = \begin{array}{ll} 1 & \text{if } \mathbf{II} \text{ has a winning strategy;} \\ 0 & \text{if } \mathbf{I} \text{ has a winning strategy.} \end{array}$$

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
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$$\phi \longrightarrow \|\phi\|_G$$

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
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
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For First Order Logic,

GTS  $\equiv$  Tarski Semantics




# A very trivial example

$$\phi = \forall x \exists y (x=y)$$


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
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
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
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
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
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
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Eloise has a winning strategy; therefore,  $M \models \phi$

# Multi Player Logics

1. Can we generalize these techniques?
2. Which sort of logics would correspond to multi-player games?

# Multi Player Logics

0. Why would one be interested in multi-player logics?



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*Communication protocols (also data compression):*

$$\forall x_1 \dots x_n (D(x_1 \dots x_n) \rightarrow (\exists y_1 \dots y_m (M(y_1 \dots y_m) \wedge \wedge (\exists (z_1 \dots z_n) \setminus \{y_1 \dots y_m\}) (z_1 = x_1 \wedge \dots \wedge z_n = x_n))))))$$


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Information Source



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
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


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


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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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**The Information Source and the Spy are not supposed to coordinate their moves!**



# Multi Player Logics

Abramsky, 2006: Socially Responsive,  
Environmentally Friendly Logic

Abramsky, 2007: A Compositional Game Semantics  
for Multi-Agent Logics of Partial Information

## **See also:**

Tulenheimo, Venema, 2007: Propositional Logic  
for Three;

Tulenheimo, 2007: Satisfiability and Validity  
from a 3-player Perspective;

Loohuis, 2008: Multi-player Logics;

Loohuis, Venema, 2009: Logics and Algebras for  
Multiple Players;

# Concrete Data Structures

**Concrete Data Structures** (Kahn, Plotkin, 1975):

$$M = (C, V, D, |- )$$

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$$M = (C, V, D, |-)$$

$C$  = *cells* (loci of decisions);

$V$  = *values* (that a cell can take);

$D$  = *decisions* ( $\subseteq C \times V$ );

$|-$  = *enabling relation* ( $\subseteq P_f(D) \times C$ )

# Concrete Data Structures

A state  $s$  over  $M$  is a subset of  $D$  such that

$$(c, v_1), (c, v_2) \in s \Rightarrow v_1 = v_2;$$

If  $(c, v) \in s$  then  $\exists (c_1, v_1) \dots (c_k, v_k) = (c, v)$  s.t.,  $\forall i \in 1 \dots k$ ,

$$(c_i, v_i) \in s \text{ and } \Gamma_i \vdash c_i \text{ for some } \Gamma_i \subseteq \{(c_1, v_1) \dots (c_{i-1}, v_{i-1})\}$$

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$\lambda : C \rightarrow A$  *labeling function*,  $A =$  the set of players

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
$$\forall x (P(x) \vee \exists y Q(y))$$

$$C = \{x, y, \vee\};$$

$$V = \{a, b, L, R\};$$

$$D = \{(x, a), (x, b), (y, a), \\ (y, b), (\vee, L), (\vee, R)\};$$

$$\vdash = \{ (\{(x, a)\}, \vee), (\{(x, b)\}, \vee), \\ (\{(\vee, R)\}, y) \}.$$



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Primitives:

Atomic formulas: empty game  $(\emptyset, \emptyset, \emptyset, \emptyset)$

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Atomic formulas: empty game  $(\emptyset, \emptyset, \emptyset, \emptyset)$ ;

Quantifiers:  $Q_\alpha, \alpha \in A$ :

$(\{c_0\}, E, \{c_0\} \times E, \vdash_Q)$ , where  $\vdash_Q = \{(\emptyset, c_0)\}$   
 $\lambda(c_0) = \alpha$

$C_0$   $E = \{a, b, c, \dots\}$



# Concrete Data Structures

Operations:

Choice connectives:  $M \oplus_{\alpha} N$ ,  $\alpha \in A$ :

$(C_M \cup^d C_N \cup^d \{c_0\}, V_M \cup V_N \cup \{L, R\},$   
 $D_M \cup^d D_N \cup^d \{(c_0, L), (c_0, R)\}, \vdash_{M \oplus_{\alpha} N})$


$(c_0, L), \Gamma \vdash_{M \oplus_{\alpha} N} c$  iff  $\Gamma \vdash_M c$ ;

$(c_0, R), \Gamma \vdash_{M \oplus_{\alpha} N} c$  iff  $\Gamma \vdash_N c$ .

$\lambda_{M \oplus_{\alpha} N}(c_0) = \alpha$ ;

$c \in M \Rightarrow \lambda_{M \oplus_{\alpha} N}(c) = \lambda_M(c)$ ;

$c \in N \Rightarrow \lambda_{M \oplus_{\alpha} N}(c) = \lambda_N(c)$ .



# Concrete Data Structures

Operations:

Parallel Composition:  $M \parallel N$ :

$$(C_M \cup^d C_N, V_M \cup V_N, D_M \cup^d D_N, \vdash_M \cup^d \vdash_N)$$

$$c \in M \Rightarrow \lambda_{M \oplus_\alpha N}(c) = \lambda_M(c);$$

$$c \in N \Rightarrow \lambda_{M \oplus_\alpha N}(c) = \lambda_N(c).$$




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Operations:

Sequential Composition:  $M \cdot N$ :

$(C_M \cup^d C_N, V_M \cup V_N, D_M \cup^d D_N, \vdash_{M \cdot N})$

$\Gamma \vdash_{M \cdot N} c$  iff  $\Gamma \vdash_M c$  or  $\Gamma = s \cup \Delta$ ,  
 $s \in \text{Max}(M), \Delta \vdash_N c$ ;



$c \in M \Rightarrow \lambda_{M \oplus_\alpha N}(c) = \lambda_M(c)$ ;

$c \in N \Rightarrow \lambda_{M \oplus_\alpha N}(c) = \lambda_N(c)$ .

# Concrete Data Structures

Operations:

Role switching:  $\pi(M)$ ,  $\pi : A \rightarrow A$  permutation

$(C_M, V_M, D_M, \vdash_M)$

$c \in M \Rightarrow \lambda_{\pi(M)} = \pi(\lambda_M(c));$

# Concrete Data Structures

(Tulenheimo, 2007) and (Tulenheimo and Venema, 2007):

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Role	Player
I	Abelard
II	Barbara
III	Charlie

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From role permutations to *role distribution permutations*

$(A,B,C) \rightarrow (B,C,A); (A,C,B) \rightarrow (C,B,A); (B,A,C) \rightarrow (A,C,B);$   
 $(B,C,A) \rightarrow (C,A,B); (C,A,B) \rightarrow (A,B,C); (C,B,A) \rightarrow (B,A,C).$

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I	Abelard	Barbara	Abelard	Charlie
II	Barbara	Charlie	Charlie	Barbara
III	Charlie	Abelard	Barbara	Abelard

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I	Abelard	Barbara	Abelard	Charlie
II	Barbara	Charlie	Charlie	Barbara
III	Charlie	Abelard	Barbara	Abelard

With  $n$  players,  $(n)!$  “negations”!

# Concrete Data Structures

$\phi ::= Rx_1 \dots x_n \mid \pi(\phi) \mid \phi \oplus_\alpha \phi \mid Q_\alpha x \mid (\phi \parallel \phi) \mid \phi \cdot \phi$

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

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


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# Strategies

M Labeled Concrete Data Structure,  $D(M)$  = set of *configurations*

$D(M)^T = D(M) \cup \{T\}$  (T = “no strategy found”)

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$CI_\alpha(M) = \{s : s \text{ satisfies S1 ... S4}\}$

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$c_1$

$c_2$

$c_3$

$c_4$

$c_5$

$c_6$




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


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


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


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


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$$\gamma_M: C_M \rightarrow [D(M) \rightarrow D(M)]$$

$$s \succ c \text{ iff } \exists v (c, v) \in s$$

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


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


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


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If  $\phi$  is atomic,  $\|\phi\| = (\emptyset, \emptyset, \emptyset, \emptyset)$  and  $\gamma_{\|\phi\|} = \emptyset$ ;

If  $\phi$  is a quantifier,  $C_{\|\phi\|} = \{c_0\}$  and  $\gamma_{\|\phi\|} = \emptyset$ ;

$$\gamma_{\|\pi(\phi)\|} = \gamma_{\|\phi\|}.$$

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$$\gamma_{\|\phi \oplus_\alpha \psi\|}(c)(s)$$

$$= \emptyset$$


if  $c=c_0$ ;

$$= \{(c_0, L)\} \cup \gamma_{\|\phi\|}(c)(s - \{(c_0, L)\})$$

if  $c$  in  $C_{\|\phi\|}$ ;

$$= \{(c_0, R)\} \cup \gamma_{\|\psi\|}(c)(s - \{(c_0, R)\})$$

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$$\begin{aligned} \gamma_{\|\phi \parallel \psi \parallel}(c)(s) &= \gamma_{\|\phi \parallel}(c)(\pi_M(s)) \quad \text{if } c \in C_{\|\phi \parallel}; \\ &= \gamma_{\|\psi \parallel}(c)(\pi_N(s)) \quad \text{if } c \in C_{\|\psi \parallel}. \end{aligned}$$

$\|\phi\|$

$\|\psi\|$


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$$\begin{aligned} \gamma_{\|\phi \cdot \psi\|}(c)(s) &= \gamma_{\|\phi\|}(c)(\pi_M(s)) && \text{if } c \in C_{\|\phi\|}; \\ &= \pi_{\|\phi\|}(s) \cup \gamma_{\|\psi\|}(c)(\pi_N(s)) && \text{if } c \in C_{\|\psi\|}. \end{aligned}$$



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*Weak Progression Assumption (WP):*  $s \vdash_M c, s \not\downarrow c \Rightarrow \sigma(s) \neq s$

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*Weak Progression Assumption (WP):*  $s \Vdash_M c, s \not\downarrow c \Rightarrow \sigma(s) \neq s$

*Strong Progression Assumption (SP):*  $s \Vdash_M c \Rightarrow \sigma(s) \downarrow c$

**Theorem:**  $WP \Leftrightarrow SP$

$\Rightarrow$  : obvious.

$\Leftarrow$  : if  $s \Vdash_M c, \sigma(s) \not\downarrow c$ , then  $\sigma(\sigma(s)) = \sigma(s) \not\downarrow c$ .



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$S$  is *safe* iff  $T \notin \text{Dom}(s)$

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
$$(\sigma_{\alpha})_{\alpha \in A} \in \prod_{\alpha \in A} S_{\alpha}$$

Define

$$\langle \sigma_{\alpha} \rangle_{\alpha \in A} = \min \{ s \in D(M)^T : \sigma_{\alpha}(s) = s \text{ for all } \alpha \}$$

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
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$S_I$ :  $\{(II, L)\} \rightarrow \{(II, L), (I, a)\}$ ;  
 $\{(II, R)\} \rightarrow \{(II, L), (I, b)\}$ ;  
 $s \rightarrow s$  otherwise.

$S_{II}$ :  $\emptyset \rightarrow \{(II, R)\}$ ;  
 $\{(II, R), (I,a)\} \rightarrow \{(II, R), (I, a), (II, b)\}$ ;  
 $\{(II, R), (I,b)\} \rightarrow \{(II, R), (I, b), (II, a)\}$ ;  
 $s \rightarrow s$  otherwise.

$S_{III}$ :  $\{(II, L), (I,a)\} \rightarrow \{(II, L), (I, a), (III, L)\}$ ;  
 $\{(II, L), (I,b)\} \rightarrow \{(II, L), (I, b), (III, R)\}$ ;  
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
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$$(Q_I x \cdot (Px \oplus_{III} Sx)) \oplus_{II} Q_I x \cdot Q_{II} y \cdot T(x,y,y)$$

$S_I$ :  $\{(II, L)\} \rightarrow \{(II, L), (I, a)\}$ ;  
 $\{(II, R)\} \rightarrow \{(II, L), (I, b)\}$ ;  
 $s \rightarrow s$  otherwise.

$S_{II}$ :  $\emptyset \rightarrow \{(II, R)\}$ ;  
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$\emptyset$


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$\{(II, R)\}$


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
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$\{(II, R), (I, b), (II, a)\}$

# Outcomes and Valuations

So far, no payoffs, and variable assignments.



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$$\frac{\phi: X \rightarrow Y}{\phi: X \cup Z \rightarrow Y \cup W} \quad (W \subseteq Z);$$

# Outcomes and Valuations

$$\frac{\phi: X \rightarrow Y \quad \psi: Y \rightarrow Z}{\phi \cdot \psi: X \rightarrow Z};$$

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$$\frac{\phi: X \rightarrow Y \quad \psi: Y \rightarrow Z}{\phi \cdot \psi: X \rightarrow Z};$$

$$\frac{\phi: X \rightarrow Y \quad \psi: X \rightarrow Y}{\phi \oplus_{\alpha} \psi: X \rightarrow Y};$$

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$$\frac{\phi: X \rightarrow Y \quad \psi: Y \rightarrow Z}{\phi \cdot \psi: X \rightarrow Z};$$

$$\frac{\phi: X \rightarrow Y \quad \psi: X \rightarrow Y}{\phi \oplus_{\alpha} \psi: X \rightarrow Y};$$

$$\frac{\phi: X_1 \rightarrow Y_1 \quad \psi: X_2 \rightarrow Y_2}{\phi \parallel \psi: X_1 \cup^d X_2 \rightarrow Y_1 \cup^d Y_2}.$$



# Outcomes and Valuations

$$\frac{\phi: X \rightarrow Y \quad \psi: Y \rightarrow Z}{\phi \cdot \psi: X \rightarrow Z};$$

$$\frac{\phi: X \rightarrow Y \quad \psi: X \rightarrow Y}{\phi \oplus_{\alpha} \psi: X \rightarrow Y};$$

$$\frac{\phi: X_1 \rightarrow Y_1 \quad \psi: X_2 \rightarrow Y_2}{\phi \parallel \psi: X_1 \cup^d X_2 \rightarrow Y_1 \cup^d Y_2}.$$

$\phi$  is a *formula* iff  $\phi: X \rightarrow \emptyset$

$\phi$  is a *sentence* iff  $\phi: \emptyset \rightarrow \emptyset$

# Outcomes and Valuations

$$Q_I x \cdot (Q_{II} y \cdot (Px \oplus_{II} Rxy) \parallel Rxx)$$

$$\emptyset \rightarrow \{x\} \quad \emptyset \rightarrow \{y\} \quad \{x\} \rightarrow \emptyset \quad \{x,y\} \rightarrow \emptyset \quad \{x\} \rightarrow \emptyset$$

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$$Q_I x \cdot (Q_{II} y \cdot (Px \oplus_{II} Rxy) \parallel Rxx)$$

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 \emptyset \rightarrow \{x\} & \emptyset \rightarrow \{y\} & \{x\} \rightarrow \emptyset & \{x,y\} \rightarrow \emptyset & \{x\} \rightarrow \emptyset & \\
 & \underline{\hspace{1.5cm}} & \underline{\hspace{1.5cm}} & & & \\
 & \{x\} \rightarrow \{x,y\} & \{x,y\} \rightarrow \emptyset & & & \\
 & & \underline{\hspace{1.5cm}} & & & \\
 & & \{x,y\} \rightarrow \emptyset & & & 
 \end{array}$$

# Outcomes and Valutations

$$Q_I x \cdot (Q_{II} y \cdot (Px \oplus_{II} Rxy) \parallel Rxx)$$

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \emptyset \rightarrow \{x\} \quad \underline{\emptyset \rightarrow \{y\}} \quad \underline{\{x\} \rightarrow \emptyset} \quad \{x,y\} \rightarrow \emptyset \quad \{x\} \rightarrow \emptyset \\
 \{x\} \rightarrow \{x,y\} \quad \{x,y\} \rightarrow \emptyset \\
 \hline
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 \hline
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# Outcomes and Valuations

$$(Q_I x \oplus_{III} Q_{II} x) \cdot Q_{III} y \cdot Rxy$$

$$\emptyset \rightarrow \{x\}$$

$$\emptyset \rightarrow \{x\}$$

$$\emptyset \rightarrow \{y\}$$

$$\{x,y\} \rightarrow \emptyset$$

# Outcomes and Valuations

$$(Q_I x \oplus_{III} Q_{II} x) \cdot Q_{III} y \cdot Rxy$$

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$$\emptyset \rightarrow \{x\}$$

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---

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# Outcomes and Valuations


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# Strategies for open formulas

$$\phi: X \rightarrow Y$$

strategy for  $\phi = (\sigma_\eta) : \eta \in X^E$

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strategy for  $\phi = (\sigma_\eta) : \eta \in X^E$

$$\langle (\sigma_\eta)_\alpha \rangle : X^E \rightarrow \text{Max}(\phi)$$

$$\langle (\sigma_\eta)_\alpha \rangle(\eta_0) = \langle \sigma_{\eta_0} \rangle$$



# Outcomes and Valuations

$$\phi: X \rightarrow Y, s \in \text{Max}(\|\phi\|)$$

$$\text{bind}_{\|\phi\|}(s) : (Y \setminus X) \rightarrow C_M$$

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# Outcomes and Valuations

$$\phi, \psi: X \rightarrow Y$$

$$\text{bind}_{\|\phi \oplus_a \psi\|}(s)(y) = \begin{cases} \text{bind}_{\|\phi\|}(s)(y) & \text{if } (c_0, L) \in s \\ \text{bind}_{\|\psi\|}(s)(y) & \text{if } (c_0, R) \in s \end{cases}$$

# Outcomes and Valuations

$$\phi: X_1 \rightarrow Y_1, \psi: X_2 \rightarrow Y_2$$

$$\text{bind}_{\|(\phi \parallel \psi)\|}(s)(y) = \begin{cases} \text{bind}_{\|\phi\|}(s)(y) & \text{if } y \in Y_1 \setminus (X_1 \cup X_2) \\ \text{bind}_{\|\psi\|}(s)(y) & \text{if } y \in Y_2 \setminus (X_1 \cup X_2) \end{cases}$$

# Outcomes and Valuations

$$\phi: X \rightarrow Y, \psi: Y \rightarrow Z$$

$$\text{bind}_{\|\phi \cdot \psi\|}(s)(y) = \begin{cases} \text{bind}_{\|\phi\|}(s)(y) & \text{if } y \in Z \cap (Y \setminus X) \\ \text{bind}_{\|\psi\|}(s)(y) & \text{if } y \in Z \setminus (Y \cup X) \end{cases}$$

# Outcomes and Valuations

$$(V, \otimes, \odot, 1)$$



# Outcomes and Valuations

$$(V, \otimes, \odot, 1)$$

$\otimes, \odot$  associative;

$\otimes$  commutative;

$$x \otimes 1 = 1 \otimes x = x;$$

$$x \odot 1 = 1 \odot x = x.$$

# Outcomes and Valuations

$$\phi: X \rightarrow Y$$

$$\text{val}_{\|\phi\|, \alpha}: E^X \times \text{Max}(\|\phi\|) \rightarrow V$$

- If  $\phi$  atomic,  $\text{val}_{\|\phi\|, \alpha}(\eta, \emptyset) \in V$  is given;
- $\text{val}_{\|Q_\alpha \phi\|, \alpha}(\eta, s) = 1$ ;
- $\text{val}_{\|\pi(\phi)\|, \alpha}(\eta, s) = \text{val}_{\|\phi\|, \pi^{-1}(\alpha)}(\eta, s)$ ;

# Outcomes and Valuations

$$\phi: X \rightarrow Y$$

$$\text{val}_{\|\phi\|, \alpha}: E^X \times \text{Max}(\|\phi\|) \rightarrow V$$

$$\text{val}_{\|\phi \oplus_a \psi\|, \alpha}(\eta, \{(c_0, L)\} \cup s) = \text{val}_{\|\phi\|, \alpha}(\eta, s);$$

$$\text{val}_{\|\phi \oplus_a \psi\|, \alpha}(\eta, \{(c_0, R)\} \cup s) = \text{val}_{\|\psi\|, \alpha}(\eta, s).$$

# Outcomes and Valuations

$$\phi: X_1 \rightarrow Y_1, \psi: X_2 \rightarrow Y_2$$

$$\text{val}_{\|(\phi \parallel \psi)\|, \alpha}(\eta, s) = \text{val}_{\|\phi\|, \alpha}(\pi_{\|\phi\|} \eta, \pi_{\|\phi\|} s) \otimes \text{val}_{\|\psi\|, \alpha}(\pi_{\|\psi\|} \eta, \pi_{\|\psi\|} s)$$

# Outcomes and Valuations

$$\phi: X \rightarrow Y, \psi: Y \rightarrow Z$$

$$\text{val}_{\|\phi \cdot \psi\|, \alpha}(\eta, s) = \text{val}_{\|\phi\|, \alpha}(\pi_{\|\phi\|} \eta, \pi_{\|\phi\|} s) \odot \text{val}_{\|\psi\|, \alpha}(\eta', \pi_{\|\psi\|} s)$$

$$\eta'(y) = \begin{cases} \eta(y), & \text{if } y \in X; \\ s(\text{bind}_{\|\phi\|}(s)(y)), & \text{if } y \in (Y \setminus X). \end{cases}$$

# A very trivial example, part II

$$Q_I x \cdot Q_{II} y \cdot (x=y) : \emptyset \rightarrow \emptyset$$

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$$Q_I x : \emptyset \rightarrow \{x\};$$


$$\text{Bind}_{Q_I x}(s)(x) \boxed{c_0} \text{Val}_{Q_I x}(\eta, s) = 1$$

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$$Q_I x \cdot Q_{II} y \cdot (x=y) : \emptyset \rightarrow \emptyset$$

$$Q_I x : \emptyset \rightarrow \{x\}; \quad Q_{II} y : \{x\} \rightarrow \{x,y\};$$

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$$\text{Val}_{x=y}(\eta, \emptyset) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \eta(x) = \eta(y); \\ 0 & \text{if } \eta(x) \neq \eta(y). \end{cases}$$

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$$\text{Bind}_{Q_{II} y}(s)(y) \quad \boxed{c_1} \quad \text{Val}_{Q_{II} y}(\eta, s) = 1$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Val}_{Q_I x \cdot Q_{II} y \cdot x=y}(\emptyset, s) &= 1 \odot 1 \odot \text{Val}_{x=y}(\{x=s(c_0), y=s(c_1)\}, \emptyset) = \\ &= 1 \text{ if } s(c_0) = s(c_1), \text{ 0 if } s(c_0) \neq s(c_1) \end{aligned}$$

# Branching Quantifiers and IF-Logic: interlude

(Henkin, 1961)

$$\left( \begin{array}{cc} \forall x & \exists y \\ \forall z & \exists w \end{array} \right) \phi(x, y, z, w)$$

# Branching Quantifiers and IF-Logic: interlude

(Henkin, 1961)

$$\left( \begin{array}{cc} \forall x & \exists y \\ \forall z & \exists w \end{array} \right) \phi(x, y, z, w)$$

$y$  may depend on  $x$ , but not on  $z$ ;  
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$y$  may depend on  $x$ , but not on  $z$ ;  
 $w$  may depend on  $z$ , but not on  $x$ .

$$\exists f \exists g \forall x \forall y \phi(x, f(x), y, g(y))$$

# Branching Quantifiers and IF-Logic: interlude

(Henkin, 1961)

$$\left( \begin{array}{l} \forall x \exists y \\ \forall z \exists w \end{array} \right) \phi(x, y, z, w)$$

*Not expressible in First Order Logic:*

$$\exists a \left( \begin{array}{l} \forall x \exists y \\ \forall z \exists w \end{array} \right) (x=y \leftrightarrow y=w) \wedge y \neq a$$

# Branching Quantifiers and IF-Logic: interlude

In general,

$$\left( \begin{array}{cc} Qx_{11} \dots & Qx_{1m} \\ \dots & \dots \\ Qx_{n1} \dots & Qx_{nm} \end{array} \right) \phi(x,y,z,w)$$

# Branching Quantifiers and IF-Logic: interlude

In general,

$$\left( \begin{array}{cc} Qx_{11} \dots & Qx_{1m} \\ \dots & \dots \\ Qx_{n1} \dots & Qx_{nm} \end{array} \right) \phi(x,y,z,w)$$

FOL + Branching Quantifiers = Existential Second Order



# Branching Quantifiers and IF-Logic: interlude

*(Hintikka and Sandu, 1989): IF-Logic*

$$\left( \begin{array}{l} \forall x \exists y \\ \forall z \exists w \end{array} \right) \phi(x,y,z,w) \rightarrow \forall x \exists y \forall z (\exists w/x) \phi(x,y,z,w)$$

# Branching Quantifiers and IF-Logic: interlude

*(Hintikka and Sandu, 1989): IF-Logic*

$$\begin{pmatrix} \forall x & \exists y \\ \forall z & \exists w \end{pmatrix} \phi(x,y,z,w) \rightarrow \begin{array}{l} \forall x \exists y \forall z (\exists w/x) \phi(x,y,z,w) \\ \forall x \exists y \forall z (\exists w/x,y) \phi(x,y,z,w) \end{array}$$

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
*(Väänänen, 2007):  $\forall x \exists y \forall z \exists w (= (w,z) \wedge \phi(x,y,z,w))$*

# A very trivial example, part III

$$\phi = \forall x (\exists y/x) (x=y)$$


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
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
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
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
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
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
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Neither player has a winning strategy.

# Multi-player imperfect information

*Branching quantifiers can be expressed using parallel products:*

$$\left( \begin{array}{cc} Q_{\alpha} x & Q_{\beta} y \\ Q_{\gamma} z & Q_{\delta} w \end{array} \right) \phi(x, y, z, w) \equiv (Q_{\alpha} x \cdot Q_{\beta} y) \parallel (Q_{\gamma} z \cdot Q_{\delta} w) \phi(x, y, z, w)$$

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What if we want IF-Quantifiers too?

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- $\text{Occ}_{\|\phi \otimes_{\alpha} \psi\|}(c) = \begin{cases} \text{Occ}_{\|\phi\|}(c) & \text{if } c \in C_{\|\phi\|}; \\ \text{Occ}_{\|\psi\|}(c) & \text{if } c \in C_{\|\psi\|}; \end{cases}$



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# Multi-player imperfect information

Adapt the definition of the visibility condition for sequential composition:

$$\gamma_{\|\phi \cdot \psi\|} = \gamma_{\|\phi\| \cdot \|\psi\|} (c)(s) = \begin{cases} \gamma_{\|\phi\|} (c)(\pi_M(s)) & \text{if } c \in C_{\|\phi\|}; \\ \pi_{\|\phi\|}(s) \cup \gamma_{\|\psi\|} (c)(\pi_N(s)) & \text{if } c \in C_{\|\psi\|}. \end{cases}$$

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
$$\mathbf{S}(s) = \{(c', v) \in D_{\|\psi\|} \mid \exists y \in \text{Occ}_{\|\psi\|}(c), \text{bind}_{\|\phi\|}(s)(y) = c'\}$$

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$$\phi = Q_I x \cdot (Q_{II} y/x) \cdot (x=y) : \emptyset \rightarrow \emptyset$$

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
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
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is not admissible!

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The value of  $y$  may not depend on the value of  $x$

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*What we have:*

- Very general framework for multiplayer Game Semantics;
- Highly abstract treatment of strategies, bound variables, valuations;
- IF quantifiers.

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*What would be nice:*

- Compositional semantics for winning strategies (generalize Hodges 1997);
- Compositional semantics for (*strong?*) Nash Equilibria (cfr. Galliani 2008) and other equilibrium notions;
- Expressive power and complexity;
- Generalize (van Benthem, 2003);
- Metalogical results  
(cfr. Loohuis, Tulenheimo, Venema)