Games

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Source textbooks Basic papers Further directions

All themes of updating knowledge, belief, preference, and other basic features of agency come together in games. Dynamic-epistemic logics have been used to analyze game solution algorithms, forward induction, as well as other scenarios in games for which the heading has been proposed of a 'Theory of Play'.

 

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Source textbooks

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• Johan van Benthem. Logic in Games. The MIT press, 2014.

 

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Basic papers

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• Johan van Benthem. Games in Dynamic-Epistemic Logic. Bulletin of Economic Research, 53(4):219-248, 2001. Text available.
• Alexandru Baltag, Sonja Smets, Jonathan Zvesper. Keep 'hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox. Synthese (Knowledge, Rationality and Action), 169(2):301-333, 2009.
• Johan van Benthem, Eric Pacuit, Olivier Roy. Toward a Theory of Play: A Logical Perspective on Games and Interaction. Games, 2(1):52-86, 2011. Prepublication version available.

 

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Further directions

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• Johan van Benthem, Sujata Ghosh, Fenrong Liu. Modelling Simultaneous Games in Dynamic Logic. Synthese (Knowledge, Rationality and Action), 165(2):247-268, 2008. Prepublication version available.
• Johan van Benthem, Amélie Gheerbrant. Game Solution, Epistemic Dynamics and Fixed-Point Logics. Fundamenta Informaticae, 100(1):19-41, 2010. Prepublication version available.
• Jianying Cui. Dynamic Epistemic Characterizations for IERS. 2012.
• Cédric Dégremont, Olivier Roy. Agreement Theorems in Dynamic-Epistemic Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 41(4):735-764, 2012.
• Federico Bobbio. A plausibility model for Iterated Eliminating Regret-Dominated Strategies algorithm. 2017.