



# Topology of Science: Empirical, Metaphysical, Erotetic (book draft)

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# Philosophy of Science



## Relevance

- What matters
- Type of inference problem
- Lower bound on content

# Philosophy of Science



## Empirical information

- Verification
- Refutation
- Underdetermination
- Learnability
- Simplicity and Ockham's razor

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# Philosophy of Science

## Reality

- Natural science vs. Data-science
- Miracles and Luck
- Negligibility



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
## Empirical information

- Verification
- Refutation
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- Learnability
- Simplicity and Ockham's razor


## Relevance

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# Three Topological Bases



# Three Topologies



# Three Topologies

Topology of  
real similarity

$\mathcal{M}^*$

$\mathcal{E}^*$

Topology of  
empirical similarity




$\mathcal{Q}^*$

Topology of  
relevant similarity



# Context of Inquiry

$$\mathfrak{C} = (W, \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{Q})$$





# 1. EROTETIC BASIS

# Erotetic Basis

- Elements of  $\mathcal{Q}$  are answers to a question.
- Answers should be concluded eventually, if true.

$\mathcal{Q}$  is a countable topological basis.

1. At worst, vacuous information  $W$  is requested.
2. Requests accumulate.
3. Requests are expressible.

# Erotetic Basis

Allows for **overlapping** answers.

1. **One-sided** questions:

verification =  $\{A, W\}$ ;

refutation =  $\{\neg A, W\}$ ,

decision =  $\{A, \neg A\}$ .

2. Replace hopeless **catch-all** hypothesis with  $W$ .

3. Quantitative (**estimation**) questions have **open intervals** as answers.

4. Science **writ large**: answers **accumulate** across disciplines.

# Erotetic Operators

Inquiry	Erotetic Topology
“You should conclude $A$ ”	$\text{int } A$
“You should deny $A$ ”	$\text{ext } A$
“You needn’t deny $A$ ”	$\text{cl } A$
“You needn’t decide $A$ ”	$\text{bdry } A$
“You needn’t conclude $A$ , even though it’s true”	$\text{frnt } \neg A$

# Erotetic Properties

Inquiry	Erotetic Topology
"A is positively relevant"	A is <b>open</b>
"A is negatively relevant"	A is <b>closed</b>
"A is relevant"	A is <b>clopen</b>

## 2. EMPIRICAL BASIS



# Empirical Basis

- Elements of  $\mathcal{E}$  are empirical information states.

$\mathcal{E}$  is a countable topological basis.


1. At worst, vacuous information  $W$  is available.
2. Available information accumulates.
3. Scientific information is recordable.

$\mathcal{E}_W$  = the set of all empirical information states true/possible in  $W$ .




# Serendipity

- $E \in \mathcal{E}_w$  says you might obtain  $E$  in  $w$  by luck.



# Achievable Information

- $E \in \mathcal{E}_w$  says diligence **will** yield at least  $E$  in  $w$ .
- Familiar **normative** requirement on experimental results.



# Empirical Modalities

Inquiry	Empirical Topology
“A will be verified”	$\text{int } A$
“A will be refuted”	$\text{ext } A$
“A will be decided”	$\neg \text{bdry } A$
“A will never be verified”	$\text{cl } \neg A$
“A will never be refuted”	$\text{cl } A$
“A will never be decided”	$\text{bdry } A$
“A is false but will never be refuted” = Popper’s problem	$\text{frnt } A \quad (= \text{cl } A \setminus A)$
“A is true but will never be verified” = Hume’s problem	$\text{frnt } \neg A$

# Empirical Properties

Inquiry	Erotetic Topology
"A is verifiable"	A is open
"A is refutable"	A is closed
"A is decidable"	A is clopen
"A is verifutable"	A is locally closed

# Ero-Empirical Modalities

Inquiry	Ero-Empirical Topology
“A will be <b>irrelevantly</b> verified”	$\text{int } A \setminus \text{int } A$
“The <b>problem of induction</b> arises <b>relevantly</b> for A”	$\text{frnt} \neg A \cap \text{int } A$
Etc.	

# Learnability

Inquiry	Empirical Topology
“ $Q$ is answerable infallibly”	Each answer to $Q$ is $\mathcal{E}$ -open
“ $Q$ is answerable in the limit with elimination of false reasons”	Each answer to $Q$ is $\mathcal{E}$ -sigma-constructible (= countable union of differences of opens)
“ $Q$ is answerable in the limit with elimination of false answers”	Each answer to $Q$ is $\mathcal{E}$ -sigma-constructible and co-sigma-constructible.

# Popper's Analysis of Simplicity

$$A \leq B$$

iff every information state that falsifies  $B$  falsifies  $A$ .

iff  $A \subseteq \text{cl } B$ .  LOL, It's topological!

Two flaws.



1.  $W$  is strictly more complex than every other proposition, so mere suspension of judgment violates Ockham's razor!
2. Maybe  $A$  is simpler than  $B$  somewhere but not everywhere.

# Empirical Simplicity

Improvement:

- $A \triangleleft B =$  “ $A$  is strictly simpler than  $B$ ”  
=  $A \cap \text{frnt } B$ .
- $A$  is **Ockham** given  $E$  iff  
no  $B$  is possibly simpler than  $A$  given  $E$ .

**Prop.** The following are equivalent.

1.  $A$  is Ockham given  $E$ .
2.  $A$  is closed (refutable) given  $E$ .



# Ockham Necessity Theorem

**Prop.** Suppose that method  $M$ :

- answers  $Q$ ,
- eliminates false reasons,
- never drops a true reason.

Then  $M$  concludes an Ockham reason for each answer.




# 3. METAPHYSICAL BASIS



# Scientific Realism


- **Scientific realists** think science can penetrate beneath the appearances.



- To address realism, one must **represent hidden reality**.

# Metaphysical Basis


- Worlds are more or less similar.
- $\rho$  is the (dis-)similarity metric.



- $\mathcal{M}$  is the set of all open metric balls.


# Nice, but Hopeless

Which world is more similar to  $c$ ?




# Metaphysical Topology

- Hopeless comparisons are sidestepped by the induced topology  $\mathcal{M}^*$ .
  - Across models, discrete difference.
  - Within models, standard metric topology.
  - That determines the metaphysical topology uniquely.



Copernicus



Ptolemy

# Metaphysical Modalities

Inquiry	Topology
“A is <b>securely</b> true.”	$\text{int } A$
“A is <b>securely</b> false.”	$\text{ext } A$
“A has a <b>secure</b> truth value.”	$\neg \text{bdry } A$
“A is or is <b>arbitrarily close to being</b> false.”	$\text{cl } \neg A$
“A is or is <b>arbitrarily close to being</b> true.”	$\text{cl } A$
“A is <b>brittle</b> .”	$\text{bdry } A$
“A is <b>barely</b> false.”	$\text{frnt } A$
“A is <b>barely</b> true.”	$\text{frnt } \neg A$

# Metaphysical Properties

Inquiry	Metaphysical Topology
"A is natural" = "A cannot be barely true"	A is open


Natural:

- Open interval estimates (properly open).
- Models (clopen).
- Paradigms = countable disjunctions of models (clopen).

Unnatural:

- Arbitrary thresholds.
- Arbitrary quantitative models with no interpretation.
- Arbitrary parameter settings.






$\mathcal{M}^*$

$\mathcal{E}^*$


$\mathcal{Q}^*$

**LINKS**

# Clockwise




# Counter-Clockwise




# Transitive Implications

Finite Precision	$\wedge$	Relevant Reality	$\Rightarrow$	Data Retention
Finite Precision	$\wedge$	Deductive Question	$\Rightarrow$	Natural Question
Relevant Reality	$\wedge$	Deductive Question	$\Rightarrow$	Operationism
Operationism	$\wedge$	Natural Question	$\Rightarrow$	Deductive Question
Operationism	$\wedge$	Data Retention	$\Rightarrow$	Relevant Reality
Data Retention	$\wedge$	Natural Question	$\Rightarrow$	Finite Precision


# All Contexts




# Realist Contexts



# Deductive Contexts



# Operationist Contexts







**MIRACLES AND FINE-TUNING**

# Fine-tuning

- Truth of  $A$  teeters at the edge of a sea of falsehood.
- $\text{mir } A = A \cap \text{cl int } \neg A$ .



# Miracles

- $A$  is miraculous iff  $A \subseteq \text{mir } A$ .



# Famous Scientific Miracles

- The morning star is on the **same orbit** as the evening star.
- Mars' epicycle is **perfectly synchronized** with the sun's deferent.
- Reflecting telescopes produce exactly the **same illusions** as refracting telescopes.
- Light is distinct from EM radiation, even though they have **exactly the same speed**.
- It matters whether the coil or the magnet is moving, even though the **current is exactly the same**.



**NEGLECT**

# Realists **Neglect** Miracles

- Hidden realities go beyond all possible empirical information.
- Realism neglects **miraculous** possibilities of error.
- Anti-realism refuses to.

# Metaphysical Negligibility

- $A$  is nowhere dense iff  $\text{int cl } A = \emptyset$ .
- The nowhere dense propositions are a non-trivial ideal.
  1. Closed under subset.
  2. Closed under finite union.
  3. Exclude  $W$ .
- So nowhere density is a concept of negligibility.
- Unlike prior probability, it is a semantic/metaphysical concept of negligibility.

# Realism Theorem

**Prop.**  $A$  is nowhere dense iff  $A$  is miraculous.

So the miraculous propositions are exactly the negligible ones!




# Example: Theoretical Identification

$X$  = maximum elongation of Hesperus.

$Y$  = maximum elongation of Phosphorus.

$A$  = “the two planets are identical”.

$M$  = “they are different, but  $X = Y$  anyway”.




# Example: Theoretical Identification

$M$  is miraculous/negligible, so unnatural.

$A, \neg A$  are open/natural, so not miraculous/negligible.

Natural question:  $\{A, \neg A\}$ .



# Realism Vindicated

- $M$  is empirically identical to  $A$ .
- But  $M$  is negligible and  $A$  is not.
- Neglecting  $M$ , Ockham's razor mandates  $A$ .

