

# Don't be afraid of infinitary logics

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Logic4Peace

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### Lindenbaum Lemma for certain infinitary consequence relations

Let  $\vdash$  be a consequence relation on a **countable set of formulas** such that

- $\vdash$  has a countable axiomatization,
- $\text{Th}(\vdash)$  is a frame,
- the intersection of any two finitely generated theories is finitely generated.

Then the finitely meet-irreducible theories form a basis of  $\text{Th}(\vdash)$ .

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### The “original” abstract Lindenbaum Lemma

Let  $\vdash$  be a **finitary** consequence relation.

Then the **meet-irreducible** theories form a basis of  $\text{Th}(\vdash)$ .

# An example of infinitary many-valued logic

The standard MV-algebra  $[0, 1]_{\mathbb{L}}$  has the real unit interval  $[0, 1]$  as domain and operations  $\rightarrow$ ,  $\&$ ,  $\vee$ , and  $\neg$  interpreted as:

$$\begin{aligned}x \rightarrow y &= \min\{1, 1 - x + y\} & x \& y &= \max\{0, x + y - 1\} \\x \vee y &= \max\{x, y\} & \neg x &= 1 - x\end{aligned}$$

The logic of standard MV-algebra (a.k.a. **infintary Łukasiewicz logic**):

$$\Gamma \models_{\text{LSMVA}} \varphi \quad \text{iff} \quad (\forall e: \mathbf{Fm} \rightarrow [0, 1]_{\mathbb{L}})(e[\Gamma] \subseteq \{1\} \implies e(\varphi) = 1)$$

Clearly, LSMVA is not finitary, e.g.:

$$\begin{aligned}\{\neg\varphi \rightarrow \varphi \& \text{.}^n \& \varphi \mid n \geq 0\} &\models_{\text{LSMVA}} \varphi && \text{but} \\ \{\neg\varphi \rightarrow \varphi \& \text{.}^n \& \varphi \mid n \leq k\} &\not\models_{\text{LSMVA}} \varphi && \text{for each } k\end{aligned}$$

## Two examples of infinitary modal logics

- In PDL:

$$\{[\alpha; \beta^n]\varphi \mid n \in \mathbb{N}\} \vDash [\alpha; \beta^*]\varphi$$

- In logics of common knowledge:

$$\{E^{n+1}\varphi \mid n \in \mathbb{N}\} \vDash C\varphi$$

## A question and some answers

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A very incomplete list of existing answers:

1963 Hay: strongly complete axiomatization of Logic of Standard MV-Algebra

1977 Sundholm: strongly complete axiomatization of Von Wright's temporal logic

1993 Goldblatt: a general approach to modal logics with classical base

1994 Segerberg: a general method using saturated sets of formulas

2018 Bílková, Cintula, Lávička: a general method for certain algebraic logics

# Consequence relations/logics

*Fm*: a **countable** set of formulas; in propositional case given by:

- a **countable infinite** set  $\text{Var}$  of propositional variables
- an **at most countable** propositional language  $\mathcal{L}$

A **consequence relation**  $\vdash$  is a relation between sets of formulas and formulas s.t.:

- $\{\varphi\} \vdash \varphi$  (Reflexivity)
- If  $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ , then  $\Gamma \cup \Delta \vdash \varphi$  (Monotonicity)
- If  $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$  and  $\Delta \vdash \psi$  for each  $\psi \in \Gamma$ , then  $\Delta \vdash \varphi$  (Cut)

A consequence relation is

- **finitary** if:  $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$  implies there is a finite  $\Gamma' \subseteq \Gamma$  s.t.  $\Gamma' \vdash \varphi$ .
- **structural** (a.k.a. **logic**) if:  $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$  implies  $\sigma[\Gamma] \vdash \sigma(\varphi)$  for each substitution  $\sigma$

# Theories

$T \subseteq Fm$  is a **theory** of a CR  $\vdash$  if whenever  $T \vdash \varphi$ , then  $\varphi \in T$

A theory  $T$  is **prime** if it is not an intersection of two strictly bigger theories.

## Abstract Lindenbaum lemma

Let  $\vdash$  be a **finitary** CR. If  $\Gamma \not\vdash \varphi$ , then there is a prime theory  $T \supseteq \Gamma$  such that  $\varphi \notin T$ .

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The system of theories  $\text{Th}(\vdash)$  is a closure system

Lindenbaum lemma, then says that prime theories form its basis.

# 1st ingredient: Countable axiomatization

**Proofs** are trees labeled by formulas with no infinitely-long branch.

Let  $L_\infty$  be the logic given by (instances) Łukasiewicz 4 axioms, *modus ponens*, and

$$\{\neg\varphi \rightarrow \varphi \ \& \ .^n. \ \& \ \varphi \mid n \geq 0\} \triangleright \varphi \quad \text{(Hay rule)}$$

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Note: each **finitary CR has a countable axiomatic system**

Not conversely: Clearly  $L_\infty$  has a countable axiomatic system but as

$$\Gamma \vdash_{L_\infty} \varphi \quad \text{implies} \quad \Gamma \models_{\text{LSMVA}} \varphi,$$

then  $L_\infty$  is not finitary

## 2nd ingredient: Strong disjunction

A connective  $\vee$  (primitive or defined) is called **strong disjunction** in  $\vdash$  if:

$$\varphi \vdash \varphi \vee \psi \qquad \psi \vdash \varphi \vee \psi \qquad \text{(PD)}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \cup \Phi \vdash \chi \qquad \Gamma \cup \Psi \vdash \chi}{\Gamma \cup \{\varphi \vee \psi \mid \varphi \in \Phi, \psi \in \Psi\} \vdash \chi} \qquad \text{(sPCP)}$$

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If  $\vee$  is a strong disjunction, then a theory  $T$  is **prime** iff for each  $\varphi$  and  $\psi$ :  
if  $\varphi \vee \psi \in T$ , then  $\varphi \in T$  or  $\psi \in T$ .

# The main result for logics

## Lindenbaum Lemma for certain infinitary logics

Let  $\vdash$  be a logic with a **countable axiomatization and a strong disjunction**.

If  $\Gamma \not\vdash \varphi$ , then there is a prime theory  $T \supseteq \Gamma$  such that  $\varphi \notin T$ .

## The need for countable axiomatization

Consider language with  $\vee$ , and a constant  $i$  for each  $i \in \omega$ .

Let  $\vdash$  be the expansion of the disjunction-fragment of classical logic by:

$$\{i \vee \chi \mid i \in C\} \triangleright \chi$$

for each infinite set  $C \subseteq \omega$ .

Then  $\vee$  is a strong disjunction in  $\vdash$  but the Lindenbaum Lemma fails; indeed for  $\Gamma = \{2i \vee 2i + 1 \mid i \in \omega\}$  and each prime  $T \subseteq \Gamma$  we have:

$$\Gamma \not\vdash \mathbf{0} \qquad T \vdash \mathbf{0}$$

# The need for strong disjunction

Consider the logic  $\vdash$  with unary operation  $\Box$  given by rules (for  $n \geq 0$ ):

$$\{\Box^m \varphi \mid m > n\} \triangleright \varphi$$

Clearly  $\vdash$  has a countable axiomatization and

$$\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\} \vdash \chi \quad \text{iff} \quad \chi = \varphi \text{ or } \Gamma \vdash \chi$$

Thus if  $T$  is a theory, so is  $T \cup \{\psi\}$  and so only  $Fm$  is a prime theory

As there are non-trivial theories (i.e.,  $\emptyset$ ), Lindenbaum lemma has to fail

# A characterization of strong disjunction

## Theorem

Let  $\vdash$  be a logic with axiomatization  $\mathcal{AS}$ . Then  $\vee$  is a strong disjunction iff

$$\begin{array}{l} \varphi \vdash \varphi \vee \psi \quad \varphi \vee \psi \vdash \psi \vee \varphi \quad \varphi \vee \varphi \vdash \varphi \\ \{\gamma \vee \chi \mid \gamma \in \Gamma\} \vdash \varphi \vee \chi \quad \text{for each } \Gamma \triangleright \varphi \text{ from } \mathcal{AS} \end{array}$$

We can easily show that:

$$\{(\neg\varphi \rightarrow \varphi \ \& \ .^n. \ \& \ \varphi) \vee \chi \mid n \geq 0\} \vdash_{\mathbb{L}_\infty} \varphi \vee \chi,$$

and so  $\mathbb{L}_\infty$  has a strong disjunction

## An application: $L_\infty$ is the logic of standard MV-algebra

- 1) We know that it has a countable axiomatization and  $\vee$  is its strong disjunction
- 2) Thus if  $\Gamma \not\vdash_{L_\infty} \varphi$ , there is a prime theory  $T \supseteq \Gamma$  st.  $\varphi \notin T$
- 3) Take the Lindenbaum–Tarski algebra of  $T$ : we know it is a **simple** MV-chain  
(thanks to the Hay rule)
- 4) Each **simple** MV-chain is embeddable into standard MV-algebra  $[0, 1]_{\mathbb{L}}$
- 5) Thus we have a  $[0, 1]_{\mathbb{L}}$ -evaluation  $e$  such that  $e(\Gamma) \subseteq \{\bar{1}\}$  but  $e(\varphi) < 1$

## Two kinds of disjunction

A connective  $\vee$  (primitive or defined) is called **strong disjunction** in  $\vdash$  if:

$$\varphi \vdash \varphi \vee \psi \qquad \psi \vdash \varphi \vee \psi \qquad \text{(PD)}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \cup \Phi \vdash \chi \qquad \Gamma \cup \Psi \vdash \chi}{\Gamma \cup \{\varphi \vee \psi \mid \varphi \in \Phi, \psi \in \Psi\} \vdash \chi} \qquad \text{(sPCP)}$$

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In a finitary logic each disjunction is strong

but not vice-versa

## All that disjoints is not a disjunction

The lattice connective  $\vee$  need not satisfy PCP, e.g. in global S4

Indeed it would entail that  $\varphi \vee \neg\varphi \vdash_{S4}^g \Box\varphi \vee \neg\varphi$ , i.e.,

$$\vdash_{S4}^g \varphi \rightarrow \Box\varphi$$

On the other hand we can show that  $\Box\varphi \vee \Box\psi$  is a (strong) disjunction in S4:

$$\frac{\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\} \vdash_{S4}^g \chi \quad \Gamma \cup \{\psi\} \vdash_{S4}^g \chi}{\Gamma \cup \{\Box\varphi \vee \Box\psi\} \vdash_{S4}^g \chi}$$

# How to get rid of structurality?

Let  $\vdash$  be a logic with a disjunction  $\vee$ . Then

- the intersection of any two finitely generated theories is finitely generated; in particular for each finite  $\Phi, \Psi \subseteq Fm$ :

$$\text{Th}_{\vdash}(\Phi) \cap \text{Th}_{\vdash}(\Psi) = \text{Th}_{\vdash}(\{\varphi \vee \psi \mid \varphi \in \Phi, \psi \in \Psi\})$$

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- $\vee$  is a strong disjunction iff  $\text{Th}(\vdash)$  is a **frame**, i.e., for each  $S \cup \{T\} \subseteq \text{Th}(\vdash)$ :

$$T \cap \bigvee_{S \in \mathcal{S}} S = \bigvee_{S \in \mathcal{S}} (T \cap S).$$

## A more general result

### Lindenbaum Lemma for certain infinitary logics

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## A more general result

### Lindenbaum Lemma for certain infinitary CRs

Let  $\vdash$  be a **CR** with a countable axiomatization such that  $\text{Th}(\vdash)$  is a frame and the intersection of any two finitely generated theories is finitely generated.

If  $\Gamma \not\vdash \varphi$ , then there is a prime theory  $T \supseteq \Gamma$  such that  $\varphi \notin T$ .