

# **Complexity of Voting Systems**

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# Agenda

- A First Course in Complexity Theory
  - Complexity classes P and NP.
  - NP-completeness
  - Dealing with NP-completeness
- Complexity is Bad
  - Winner determination problems
    - Dodgson, Kemeny, Young...
    - Monroe, Chamberlin-Courant
    - Way around!
- Complexity is Good
  - The complexity barrier approach
  - Fighting Gibbard-Satterhwaite
  - Fighting other deamons...
  - ... and not winning





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# What is complexity theory?

**Computational complexity theory** – a formal theory that identifies and explains which tasks can be efficiently carried out on a computer.


- **Sort of...**
  - **What do you mean?**
  - **It will take 10'000 years**
  - **It's not going to be very useful then, will it?**
  - **Not particularly...**
  - **Why shouldn't I fire you?**
  - **Because there is noone better...**
- 



# Computational Problems

Function problems  
(compute a function)

Decision problems  
(yes/no answer)



Counting problems  
(How many items of a  
given type are there?)

Optimization problems  
(compute a maximum of a  
function)





# Why Decision Problems?

Because they suffice...

## Primes

**Input:**  $n$  – an integer

**Task:** compute the smallest prime factor of  $n$

**If we can solve Primes, then we can solve PrimesDecision.**

**If we can solve PrimesDecision, we can also solve Primes!**

## PrimesDecision

**Input:**  $n, k$  – integers

**Question:** Is  $n$ 's smallest prime factor smaller or equal to  $k$ ?



If we can solve Primes...

... but what does it even mean? Obviously we can solve Primes – just divide  $n$  by all number from 2 to  $n-1$



**Complexity class P (polynomial-time):**  
The class of decision problems for which there are polynomial-time , deterministic algorithms.

**The notion of effective computation!**



# Borda-Winner is in P

## Borda-Winner

**Input:**  $P=(P_1, \dots, P_n)$  is a profile of preference orders,  
 $c$  – a candidate from  $P$


**Question:** Is  $c$  a Borda winner under profile  $P$ ?

**Input size:**  $n$  voters  $\times$   $m$  candidates

### Algorithm:

For each candidate compute his/her Borda score Check if  $c$  has highest Borda score.

**Running time:**  $O(nm) \leftarrow$  polynomial!








# Primes is in P... but not as we thought it!

Simply dividing  $n$  by 2, 3, ...,  $n-1$  is an exponential time algorithm!



Doing  $O(n)$  divisions means, in fact, doing  $O(2^{\log(n)})$  divisions—exponential within the length of the encoding.

There is a more complex proof that Primes is in P though...





# Class P

A decision problem  $D$  is in class  $P$  if there exists an algorithm that given input  $I$  for  $D$ , solves  $I$  in time polynomial with respect to the length of the encoding of  $I$ .

**Examples of P-time running times** ( $n$  – size of the input):

- $n^2$
- $n \log n$
- $n^{1000}$

**Examples of running times not in P:**

- $2^n$
- $1.0000000000000000001^n$

*Sort of silly,  
but the best  
we have...*



# Computationally Hard Problems

What does it mean that a problem is computationally hard?

- No polynomial time algorithm!
- Can we prove that such problems exist?
  - Yes...
  - ... but it's useless in most cases

A different computational complexity class...



# Complexity Class NP


**Complexity class NP (nondeterministic polynomial-time):** The class of decision problems for which there are polynomial-time, nondeterministic algorithms.

**What is a nondeterministic computation?**




# (Non)deterministic Computation

Deterministic computation




Nondeterministic computation




# (Non)deterministic Computation

Deterministic computation



Nondeterministic computation



# What does it all mean?


Nondeterministic computation

- Just like normal computation ...
- ... but the algorithm can make guesses

## SetCover

**Input:**  $S = \{S_1, \dots, S_m\}$  – family of sets  
 $k$  – an integer

**Question:** Is there a family of  $k$  sets from  $S$  whose union is equal to union of all sets from  $S$ ?



# What does it all mean?


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# Complexity Class NP

**Complexity class NP (nondeterministic polynomial-time):** The class of decision problems for which there are polynomial-time, nondeterministic algorithms.

**Class NP:** Class of problems whose solutions can be verified in polynomial time.




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
**Class NP:** Class of problems whose solutions can be verified in polynomial time.

**In effect, NP is exactle the class that captures most of voting related problems. Is there a successful manipulation? If there is one, we can show it and verify that, indeed, it is successful.**






Is NP bigger than P? – that is the question!



Clearly, all problems from P also belong to NP. What about the other way round?

One of the biggest questions in ... well... all of science 😊

**If we do not know if NP is bigger, how can it help us? There is an order on the hardness of problems!**




# Partial Order of Hardness

## Reduction between problems

- A, B – two decision problems
- A reduces to B if there is a polynomial-time computable function  $f$  such that

$$x \text{ in } A \iff f(x) \text{ in } B$$



If A reduces to B, then A is no harder than B  $\rightarrow$  If we could solve B, we could solve A as well.



# Example of a Reduction

## **SAT-3CNF**

**Input:** Logical formula  $F$  in 3CNF form

**Question:** Is  $F$  satisfiable?

**reduces to**

## **SetCover**

**Input:**  $S = \{S_1, \dots, S_m\}$  – family of sets  
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


# Example of a Reduction

SetCover instance:

$$\underbrace{(x_1 \vee x_2 \vee x_3)}_A \quad \underbrace{(-x_2 \vee x_4)}_B \quad \underbrace{(-x_1 \vee -x_3)}_C \quad \underbrace{(-x_2 \vee -x_3 \vee -x_4)}_D$$

SetCover instance:




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
We can take 4 sets

# Example of a Reduction

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
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


We can take 4 sets





Is NP bigger than P? – that is the question!



**NP-completeness:** A problem is NP- complete if it is in NP and every problem from NP reduces to it → The hardest problems in NP!

**SAT-3CNF is NP-complete...**

**... so SetCover is too!**






# NP-completeness

**Definition:** A problem is NP-complete if it belongs to NP and every problem in NP reduces to it

**Proving NP-completeness:** Take an NP-complete problem and reduce it to your problem of interest (reductions are transitive!)

**NP-complete problems are hard:** No polynomial time algorithm known for them, in spite of decades of search! A natural notion of hardness!





# NP-complete Problems: Examples

**SetCover**

**Input:**

**X3C**

**Question:**

**VertexCover**

**Input:**


**Question:**

**Partition**

**Question:**

**Input:**  $s_1, \dots, s_n$  – sequence of integers  
**Question:** Can we find a subset of these integers that sums up to exactly half the sum of all of them?





# NP-completeness: Not always beyond reach


## VertexCover

**Input:**  $G = (V, E)$  – undirected graph  
 $k$  – an integer

**Question:** Can we pick  $k$  vertices so that all edges are touched by at least one chosen vertex?

### Algorithm

Pick an edge that does not touch any vertices yet chosen. Pick both its endpoints



# NP-completeness: Not always beyond reach

## VertexCover


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**Solution at worst twice as big as the optimal one!**





# Complexity Theory: Conclusions

- P and NP – the most important complexity classes
  - P – efficient computation
  - NP – efficient verification
- NP-completeness
  - The hardest problems in NP.
  - Solving large instances seems to require millenia...
- Dealing with NP-completeness
  - Approximations...
  - .. and many many others






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# Computational issues in elections



# Winner Determination Problem

## R-Winner


**Input:**  $P=(P_1, \dots, P_n)$  – preference profile,  $c$  – a candidate from  $P$

**Question:** Is  $c$  an R winner under profile  $P$ ?

**Input size:**  $n$  voters  $\times$   $m$  candidates

**Typically easy...**

- Scoring rules (Plurality, Borda, etc.)
- STV
- Copeland, Maximin, Schuzze
- Bucklin
- Approval, and many others ...





# Winner Determination Can Be Hard!

Three interesting voting rules:



- Dodgson's
- Kemeny's
- Young's

Under each system, we wish to elect someone closest to being a Condorcet winner. Each system defines „closest” in a different way





# Dodgson's Rule

Dodgson's score: Number of swaps of adjacent candidates necessary to ensure that a candidate is a winner



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Green lady becomes Condorcet winner after one swap


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**Theorem.** Dodgson-Winner is NP-hard (and even  $P^{NP[\log n]}$ -complete).

**NP-hard:** All problems in NP reduce to it




Green lady becomes Condorcet winner after one swap

# Kemeny's Rule

Kemeny's score of a ranking: The number of inversions between the votes and the ranking.



**Theorem.** Kemeny-Winner is NP-hard (and even  $P^{NP[\log n]}$ -complete).






Kemeny-Winner is NP-hard







# Other Hard-To-Compute Rules

We will now consider the issue of electing a parliament

Given:

$P$  – preference profile

$k$  – an integer, the size of the parliament

Task:


Pick  $k$  candidates that will represent the voters

Many ways of solving the problem...



# Monroe and Chamberlin—Courant

Interesting rules to choose parliaments




**Candidates = Resources**

Election system that  
matches candidates to  
voters

# Monroe oraz Chamberlin—Courant


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**Chamberlin-Courant**  
Pick  $k$  candidates and  
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


# Monroe and Chamberlin-Courant are NP-Complete

**P** – polynomial time  
computation


**NP** – polynomial time  
verification of solutions

**eXact 3-set Cover (X3C)**




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Monroe Winner (Approval)




$k = 2$  (#elements / 3)




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






# Approximation!

**Goal:** Match candidates to voters to maximize satisfaction



# Greedy Monroe

**Input:**

$E = (C, V)$  — election

$k$  — parliament size

**Algorithm:**


$S \leftarrow \emptyset$


**for**  $i = 1$  **to**  $k$  **do:**

**for each**  $c$  **in**  $C - S$ :

$V(c) \leftarrow n/k$  voters ranking  $c$  highest

$\text{score}(c) \leftarrow$  points of  $c$  in  $V(c)$



 : 10



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
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
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
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$k$  — parliament size

**Algorithm:**


$S \leftarrow \emptyset$

**for**  $i = 1$  **to**  $k$  **do:**

**for each**  $c$  **in**  $C - S$ :

$V(c) \leftarrow n/k$  voters ranking  $c$  highest

$\text{score}(c) \leftarrow$  points of  $c$  in  $V(c)$



# Greedy Monroe

**Input:**

$E = (C, V)$  — election

$k$  — parliament size

**Algorithm:**

$S \leftarrow \emptyset$

**for**  $i = 1$  **to**  $k$  **do:**

**for each**  $c$  **in**  $C - S$ :

$V(c) \leftarrow n/k$  voters ranking  $c$  highest

$\text{score}(c) \leftarrow$  points of  $c$  in  $V(c)$

$c^* \leftarrow \text{argmax}_{c \in C} (\text{score}(c))$


$S \leftarrow S \cup \{c^*\}$

$V \leftarrow V - V(c^*)$

$C \leftarrow C - \{c^*\}$

assign  $c^*$  to voters from  $V(c^*)$

**return** computed assignment




# How Good is Greedy Monroe?

Consider the situation after the  $i$ -th iteration

By the pigeonhole principle, there are at

$i$  potentially


$$\begin{aligned}
 \sum_{i=0}^{K-1} \frac{n}{K} \cdot \left( m - i - \left\lceil \frac{m-i}{K-i} \right\rceil \right) &\geq \sum_{i=0}^{K-1} \frac{n}{K} \cdot \left( m - i - \frac{m-i}{K-i} - 1 \right) \\
 &= \sum_{i=1}^K \frac{n}{K} \cdot \left( m - i - \frac{m-1}{K-i+1} + \frac{i-2}{K-i+1} \right) \\
 &= \frac{n}{K} \left( \frac{K(2m-K-1)}{2} - (m-1)H_K + K(H_K - 1) - H_K \right) \\
 &= (m-1)n \left( 1 - \frac{K-1}{2(m-1)} - \frac{H_K}{K} + \frac{H_K-1}{m-1} - \frac{H_K}{K(m-1)} \right) \\
 &> (m-1)n \left( 1 - \frac{K-1}{2(m-1)} - \frac{H_K}{K} \right)
 \end{aligned}$$



$$\geq \frac{n}{m-i} \binom{m-i}{K} \binom{m-i}{K-i} = \frac{n}{K}$$



# How Good is Greedy Monroe?





# Winner Determination: Conclusions

- Most voting rules have efficient winner determination procedures
  - Scoring rules, STV, Bucklin, ...
  - Copeland, Maximin, Schulze
- But for some it is computationally hard
  - Dodgson, Kemeny, Young
  - Monroe, Chamberlin-Courant
  - ... But almost always there is a workaround (almost)






# Agenda

- A First Course in Complexity Theory
  - Complexity classes P and NP.
  - NP-completeness
  - Dealing with NP-completeness
- Complexity is Bad
  - Winner determination problems
    - Dodgson, Kemeny, Young...
    - Monroe, Chamberlin-Courant
    - Way around!
- **Complexity is Good**
  - **The complexity barrier approach**
  - **Fighting Gibbard-Satterhwaite**
  - **Fighting other deamons...**
  - **... and not winning**



# Computational issues in elections

Winner determination



Cheating in elections

Running the election



Manipulation

bribery

control

Possible winner

Campaign management




Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem

# Complexity Barrier Approach

**Model:** Represent each cheating strategy as a computational decision problem.

**Complexity barrier approach:** If manipulating elections is hard, then we can ignore the fact that it is in principle possible.



Approach initiated by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick in the late 80s and the early 90s



# Complexity Barrier: Results



- Effects of complexity barrier research
  - Dozens of computational problems identified
  - Multiple standard election systems analyzed
  - Quite thorough understanding of **worst case** complexity of elections
  
- Complications...
  - We would like **some** of the problems to be efficiently computable
    - Determining winners
    - Organizing a campaign
  - Worst-case analysis seems problematic...



# Control under Plurality



## Control by adding voters

### Given:

$E = (C, V)$  – an election


$W$  – additional voters


$p$  in  $C$  – preferred candidate

$k$  – budget


### Question:

Is it possible to ensure  $p$ 's victory by adding at most  $k$  voters



$p =$  

$k = 2$



# Control under Plurality



## Control by adding voters

### Given:

$E = (C, V)$  – an election


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
### Question:

Is it possible to ensure  $p$ 's victory by adding at most  $k$  voters



$p =$  

$k = 2$





# Control under Plurality

## Control by adding candidates

### Given:

$E = (C, V)$  – an election


$A$  – additional candidates

$p$  in  $C$  – preferred candidate



$k$  – budget

### Question:

Is it possible to ensure  $p$ 's victory by adding at most  $k$  candidates

$p =$  

$k = 2$



# Control under Plurality

## Control by adding candidates

### Given:

$E = (C, V)$  – an election


$A$  – additional candidates


$p$  in  $C$  – preferred candidate

$k$  – budget


### Question:

Is it possible to ensure  $p$ 's victory by adding at most  $k$  candidates



$p =$  

$k = 2$



# Control by Adding Candidates $\in$ NP-com




**Proof:** Reduction from the X3C problem

## Exact Cover by 3-Sets

**Input:**  $B = \{b_1, b_2, b_3, \dots, b_{3k}\}$   
 $S = \{S_1, \dots, S_n\}$

$B = \{ \text{red circle}, \text{blue circle}, \text{yellow circle}, \text{green circle}, \text{purple circle}, \text{grey circle} \}$




**Question:** Is it possible to pick  $k$  sets and cover all elements from  $B$ ?

## Control by Adding Candidates

$s(p) = T$

$s(\text{red}) = s(\text{blue}) = s(\text{yellow}) = T+1$

$s(\text{green}) = s(\text{purple}) = s(\text{grey}) = T+1$



# Control by Adding Candidates $\in$ NP-com




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## Exact Cover by 3-Sets

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
**Question:** Is it possible to pick  $k$  sets and cover all elements from  $B$ ?

## Control by Adding Candidates

$s(p) = T$


$s(\text{red}) = s(\text{blue}) = s(\text{yellow}) = T$

$s(\text{green}) = s(\text{purple}) = s(\text{grey}) = T$




# Shift Bribery

- Allowed swaps:
  - Have to involve our candidate
- Realistic?
  - As bribery: **Yes**
  - Also: as a **campaigning model!**
- Gain in complexity?



# The Algorithm

Why 2-approximation?



# The Algorithm

Why 2-approximation?




$a_{i+1}$   $a_i$



gains  $a_{i+1} - a_i$  points




loses  $a_{i+1} - a_i$  points

Getting **2x** the points for   
than the best bribery gives  
is sufficient to win

# The Algorithm

Why 2-approximation?




$a_{i+1}$   $a_i$





gains  $a_{i+1} - a_i$  points



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Getting **2x** the points for  than the best bribery gives is sufficient to win


Operation of the algorithm

1. Guess a cost  $k$
2. Get most points for  t cost  $k$
3. Guess a cost  $k' \leq k$
4. Get most points for  : cost  $k'$

This is a 2-approximation... but works in polynomial time only if **prices are encoded in unary**




# Why Does the Algorithm Work?




## Operation of the algorithm

1. Guess a cost  $k$
2. Get most points for **p** at cost  $k$
3. Guess a cost  $k' \leq k$
4. Get most points for **p** at cost  $k'$


# Why Does the Algorithm Work?




O – the optimal solution → gives **p** some T points





# Why Does the Algorithm Work?




O – the optimal solution  $\rightarrow$  gives **p** some T points



S – solution that gives most points at cost k



# Why Does the Algorithm Work?



O – the optimal solution → gives **p** some T points



S – solution that gives most points at cost k



min(O,S) – min shift of the two in each vote gives some D points to **p**




Now it is possible to complete min(O,S) in two independent ways:

1. By continuing as S does (getting at least T-D points extra)
2. By continuing as O does (getting T-D points extra)



## Why Does the Algorithm Work?




Now it is possible to complete  $\min(O,S)$  in two independent ways:

1. By continuing as S does (getting at least T-D points extra)
2. By continuing as O does (getting T-D points extra)

After we perform shifts from  $\min(O,S)$ , there is a way to make p win by shifts that give him T-D points


Thus, any shift that gives him  $2(T-D)$  points, makes him a winner.

It is easy to find these  $2(T-D)$  points. **We're done!**




# The Algorithm (General Case)

2-approximation algorithm  
for unary prices




Scaling argument + twists

$2+\epsilon$ -approximation scheme  
for any prices




Bootstrapping-flavored argument

2-approximation algorithm  
for any prices





# The Algorithm

Why 2-approximation?





$a_{i+1}$   $a_i$

 gains  $a_{i+1} - a_i$  points

 loses  $a_{i+1} - a_i$  points

Operation of the algorithm

1. Guess a cost  $k$
2. Get most points for  t cost  $k$
3. ~~Guess a cost  $k' \leq k$~~
4. ~~Get most points for  t cost  $k'$~~

Is this algorithm still a 2-approximation? Unclear!



# Complexity Barrier: Conclusions

- Complexity theory can mean protection from manipulation
  - Most cheating problems are NP-complete...
  - ... but it is a worst-case notion
    - Approximation
    - Heuristics
    - FPT attacks (oops! Did not mention them)
- Some means of interpreting hardness/algorithmic results
  - Axiomatic view!







Thank You!

