COST Action IC1205 on Computational Social Choice: (STSM Report)
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Umberto and I have worked on a model of voting where companies are interested in the evaluation given by customers and the aggregated evaluations of customers directly affects the payoff that each company receives. We have studied existing methods of aggregating evaluation and shown how these are not bribery-proof: if companies are allowed to incentivise customers to increase their individual evaluations then, in all interesting cases, these incentives yield a net gain.

We have proposed a new method for aggregating evaluations, and we have shown that bribery is always more costly than the traditional methods while, in some interesting cases, it is bribery-proof. We have formulated some conjectures concerning the structure of optimal strategies and the computational complexity of how to construct them. We believe our findings can start a fruitful high impact research line.

On top of that I have given a talk at University of Tolouse on backwards induction and limited foresight, which was very well received and originated some inspiring discussion. The talk was attended by logicians, computer scientists and game theorists.

Overall, one of my most productive research visits ever.