

COST Action IC1205 on Computational Social Choice: STSM Report

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During my visit at the University of Amsterdam, I closely worked with Ulle Endriss and Svetlana Obraztsova from Tel-Aviv University, who was visiting there at the same time.

We considered voting scenarios with different levels of information to the voters: either incomplete or imperfect, or both. For instance, in case of incomplete information, voters may only be informed about the winners of the election, or the scores of the candidates, or provided with the corresponding (weighted) majority graph, but not given a full voting profile. Moreover, if the information is imperfect, they would be only informed about a set of possible winners, intervals of scores, or majority graphs with missing edges or intervals of weights.

In these scenarios, we explored the manipulability / resistance to manipulation of different voting rules. We established several results for Plurality, Veto, Borda, Copeland and Maximin. Currently, we are working on extending some of these results to all positional scoring rules.