COST Action IC1205 on Computational Social Choice: STSM Report
Applicant: Burak Can
Home institution: Maastricht University
Home country: the Netherlands
Host: Péter Csóka
Host institution: Hungarian Academy of Sciences & Corvinus University of Budapest
Host country: Hungary
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Report

I was hosted by Péter Csóka in Budapest, Hungary. The visit has been most fruitful.

Péter Csóka and I had preliminary results on non-manipulability of delegation games. We introduced this game in the context of choosing representative preferences, interpreted as a delegation, for a heterogenous society. In case, agents favor "closer" representation in the delegation than "further", the game is open to manipulation. We analyzed different aspects of the game and found some positive results in terms of strategy-proofness.

The preliminary result on the non-manipulability of the delegation games, and possibly a complete characterization of the class of strategy-proof mechanisms will help publish this work in a good quality journal. Further, the implications of this research will deepen our understanding about how we can choose delegations in peace processes and conflict resolution in cases segregated and heterogenous societies. The implementation of possible strategy proof mechanisms in venues such as UN Securiy Council and OSCE institutions concerning conflict resolution.

During this visit, I also had the chance to give a talk at Péter Csóka's institution, Corvinus University of Budapest. We had very nice feedback on the possible applications of the delegate game.